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DDI - 778/82

29 January 1982

State Dept. review completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence *DL(jw)*

FROM: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: Status of U.S. Soviet INF Talks

1. INF negotiations resumed on 12 January after a four week holiday recess. Since then there have been four plenary meetings as well as lengthy informal discussions between U.S. and Soviet delegates. The two sides have used these opportunities to elaborate upon and buttress positions established prior to the holiday recess. The Soviet position is basically unchanged although they are now taking a somewhat more polemical approach. Gromyko, in meeting with Haig, expanded somewhat the Soviet proposal for reductions tabled shortly before the Christmas recess.

2. General Approaches. The U.S. opened the current phase of negotiations by reiterating its overall approach to INF arms limitations in order to demonstrate that we intend to continue along the same lines established in December. In subsequent plenaries the U.S. sought to debunk the Soviet myth of an INF balance in Europe and provided the rationale for:

- Eliminating rather than just reducing longer range INF missiles;
- Adopting a global approach that focused on land based INF missiles wherever located;
- Focusing on missiles rather than aircraft.

3. The Soviets, for their part, continued to assert that a balance in "medium range nuclear systems" exists in Europe and to press for a treaty that:

- Is confined to medium range nuclear systems in Europe or intended for use in Europe;
- Includes U.S. forward based systems (FBS) i.e., medium range nuclear aircraft;
- Includes British and French nuclear systems.

4. Poland. Prior to the first plenary meeting of the current session Ambassador Nitze met privately with his counterpart Kvitsinsky and read a prepared statement on the events in Poland (Attachment 1). Nitze, on *C-126*

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behalf of the U.S. Government, expressed grave concern over the suppression of the Polish worker's movement and indicated that future development in Poland would have a serious impact on INF negotiations. In exchange for an amelioration of the current situation, including the lifting of martial law, the U.S. was prepared to embark on a modern day version of the Marshal plan "to help the shattered Polish economy." Kvitsinsky replied with the standard line that measures being undertaken there were the internal affairs of Poland, and that the INF negotiations were of great importance and should not be linked to any outside events.

5. Haig-Gromyko. At their one day meeting in Geneva on 26 January, Foreign Minister Gromyko presented Secretary Haig with a proposal for limiting "medium range nuclear systems" which for the most part simply expands somewhat earlier Soviet proposals. This seven point plan calls for:


- a. Limitation on medium range nuclear arms, i.e., those with a range or combat radius of 1000 kms that are "located on the territory of Europe or the waters adjacent thereto, or intended for use in Europe."
- b. Reductions in these systems to an interim level of 600 by the end of 1985 and 300 by the end of 1990.
- c. Freedom to mix and modernize the remaining forces.
- d. Reductions to be accomplished either through destruction or by withdrawing systems beyond the agreed zone of limitation (i.e., beyond the Urals).
- e. Adequate verification.
- f. An agreement that will remain in force until December 31, 1990, at which time it may be extended by mutual agreement.
- g. A quantitative and qualitative moratorium on deployment of medium range systems in the European area until an agreement is reached.

6. Because the Soviet position is that some 300 French and British nuclear systems must be taken into account, this proposal in effect would permit 300 Soviet systems in Europe in 1990 and reduce U.S. systems to zero at that time, assuming no increase in Allied numbers. There would be no limit on Soviet systems east of the Urals.

7. It is clear that the Soviet proposals continue to support objectives that include:

- Preventing deployment of Pershing II and GLCM;
- Undermining NATO's decision-making authority;
- Driving a wedge between the U.S. and its European Allies
- Achieving for the USSR a position of dominance in Europe.

8. Meanwhile, in Washington, approval is being sought to permit Nitze to table the now agreed draft treaty next week.



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